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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE OIL SHALE CORPORATION, 
a Nevada Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
FRED V. LARSON, also known as Case No. 
FREDERICK V. LARS 0 N, 10887 
ETHEL B. LARSON, Husband 
and \Vi f e ; FREDERICK H. 
LARSON and DOROTHY H. 
LARSON, Husband and Wife. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks specific performance of a written 
instnm1ent. Defendants ask dismissal of the Plain-
tiff's Complaint and judgment for its costs of suit 
incurred in this proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendants adopt and agree with the statement 
in Plaintiff's Brief as to disposition in the Lower 
Court, with one exception. In the last paragraph on 
Page 2 of its Brief, Plaintiff did not inform the 
Comt that a copy of the proposed Revised Findings 
and Conclusions filed with the Lower Court on Janu-
1 
ary 6, 1967, were made available to counsel fo1· Plain-
tiff at the same time. Plaintiff's counsel had the 
opportunity to examine and study the proposed Re-
vised Findings and Conclusions for at least five weeks 
prior to the hearing in Provo, Utah on February 21, 
1967. At the hearing in February, Plaintiff's coun-
sel argued at length, and also submitted a written 
brief, in opposition to the proposed Findings and 
Conclusions tendered by Defendants' counsel. The 
Plaintiff was therefore given ample opportunity to 
oppose the proposed Findings and Conclusions which 
were subsequently adopted by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
To avoid excessive repetition, in this Brief, the 
Defendants will usually ref er to the Plaintiff as 
"Tosco," to the Defendant, Frederick H. Larson, as 
"Larson" and Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 (the letter 
of July 25, 1963 and the memorandum of July 11, 
1963) as the "July Letter." 
Tosco's Statement of Facts, although factually 
correct in most respects, omits vital parts of the 
record which are of importance to any decision in this 
case. Also, in some areas, Tosco's Statement of Facts 
constitutes argument rather than factual summary. 
Defendants off er the following supplement and com-
ment regarding Tosco's Statement of Facts: 
A. Throughout its Brief, Tosco constantly re-
fers to the July Letter as "the Agreement of July 
25, 1963." By doing so Tosco places special and re-
lJeated emphasis upon an instrument which, by its 
own terms, is identified as a "letter" (see Page 1 
thereof), the purpose of which was to" .... state the 
intention of Tosco and the shareholders of Larson 
Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to hereafter enter 
into contracts and ag1·eements giving expression 
to those understandings as they pertain to the hold-
ing of Larson Oil Co." 
B. On Page 6 of its Brief, Tosco states as fol-
lows: "They [Tosco and Defendants] also agreed 
that the option would not commence until the pay-
ment of the $20,000.00 and the signing of formal 
documents." This constitutes Tosco's interpretation 
of the July Letter. The instrument is silent as to the 
commencement or ending dates of the option. The 
record does disclose : 
1. In the New York Meeting of July 9 
and 10, 1963, Larson and Tosco agreed that 
the option period would commence July 15, 
1963 and end January 15, 1964 (Tosco Brief, 
Page 5); 
2. The understandings of the pa1ties in 
New York on July 9 and 10, which resulted in 
a memorandum of July 11, 1963, were incorpo-
rated in the July Letter; 
3. The drafts prepared by Tosco's at-
torney, Mr. Tweedy, specified option dates of 
June 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964, and the 
leases attached to those drafts as Exhibit "A" 
provided that the proposed lease was to start 
January 15, 1964 (Pl's. Exs. 14and16); 
4. The drafts prepared by Larson's 
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counsel in N ovembe1· and December of 1963, 
used the same beginning, ending and lease 
dates, and 
5. The drafts of a transaction prepal'ed 
by Tweedy in February of 1964, also called 
for the option to Commence July 15, 1963 and 
expire January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Exs. 17 and 
18.) 
C. On the bottom of Page 6 and at the top of 
Page 7 of its Brief, Tosco states: "Thereupon a new 
letter agreement of July 25, 1963, which the Trial 
Court found binding on both parties, was drafted 
in Larson's presence." (Emphasis supplied.) This 
statement is not correct. A review of the initial 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by 
the Trial Court on November 1, 1966 and the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as revised and 
entered by the Court on January 6, 1967, will con-
clusively show that the July Letter, in and by itself, 
was never considered as being binding upon the par-
ties by the Trial Court, or for that matter, by the 
parties themselves. (TR-1, Pg. 115 L 20-28; TR-1, 
Pg. 78, L 16-25.) 
D. The statement in Subparagraph 3 on Page 
8 of Tosco's Brief is incorrect. Here, Tosco states 
that the issuance of shares of Tosco stock was to be 
"subject to appropriate investment representations 
in compliance with the Federal Securities Law." 
(Emphasis supplied.) The July Letter provides that 
said shares were to be issued to Defendants "subject 
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to the delive1·y to it [Tosco] of appropriate invest-
ment representation from the recipients and subject 
to such other terms and conditions as may, in the 
opinion of counsel be required for compliance with 
the Federal Securities Law." (Emphasis supplied.) 
E. By its statement that Larson and his at-
torney "made some minor changes to conform the 
drafts to the July 25 agreement, such as substituting 
the individual shareholders as parties . . .", (see 
Page 9 of Tosco's Brief) Tosco infers that drafts of 
documents prepared by Tweedy, Tosco's attorney, 
(Plaintiff's Exs. 4 & 5) contained those understand-
ings which were expressed in the July letter. To the 
contrary, at the time Tweedy prepared Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 4 and 5, he had no knowledge of the discus-
sions which transpired between Larson, Koolsbergen 
and ·winston in Beverly Hills, California, on July 
2:3 and 24, 1963. (TR-1, Pg. 143 L 15-21.) 
F. On Page 11 of its Brief, Tosco quotes cer-
tain portions of the July Letter with the comment 
that the quoted portions of the lette1· constitute the 
"relevant terms" thereof. Such a statement is purely 
argumentative and obviously designed only to em-
phasize Tosco's position. Factually the quoted por-
tions constitute a small part of the instrument in 
question and are certainly not all of the relevant 
terms. 
G. On Page 12 of its Brief, Tosco quotes a 
portion of the testimony given by its attorney, 
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Tweedy. However, additional testimony by Tweedy 
concerning his telephone conversation with Larson is 
of extreme importance in this case. When pressed 
for a definite answer as to exactly what type of 
documents Larson agreed to sign, Mr. Tweedy final-
ly stated that Larson had advised him that the De-
fendants would sign documents if Defendants' attor-
ney and Tweedy could reach an agreement as to the 
differences then existing between Tosco and Def end-
ants. (TR-1, Pg. 148 L 8-28.) Tosco also fails to in-
form the Court that Koolsbergen acknowledged that 
Tosco paid the $20,000.00 to Defendants on the "ex-
pectation" that Defendants would execute formal 
agreements if Tweedy and Larson's counsel could 
resolve the matters in dispute. (TR-1, Pg. 100 L 17-
18.) Tweedy made no attempt to resolve those dif-
ferences with Defendants' attorney. (TR-1, Pg. 148 
L-23-30; Pg. 149 L 1-13.) 
H. On Page 13 of its Brief, Tosco refers to pay-
ment of $20,000.00 by Tosco to the Defendants in the 
form of four Tosco checks, each in the amount of 
$5,000.00. Plaintiff does not advise the Court that 
each of said checks bore a notation which showed the 
checks were issued for options granted. (Pl's. Ex. 7.) 
Of equal importance is the fact that the letter writ-
ten to Larson by Tosco's' comptroller (Defs'. Ex. 10) 
stated that the four Tosco checks were issued and 
paid to Defendants "pursuant to the agreement." 
I. On Page 13 of its Brief, Tosco states that 
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'Tweedy called Larson's attorney to obtain consent for 
a direct visitation with Larson in California. Here, 
the Court should be advised that Tweedy requested 
permission to talk with Larson only concerning prop-
erty descriptions. (TR-1 Pg. 135 L 9-15; Pg. 149 L 
1-8.) No request was made by Tweedy to discuss 
with Larson the instruments he had prepared in Feb-
ruary of 1964 (Pl's. Ex. 17 & 18). 
J. Tosco does not advise the Court of these 
events: 
1. Tosco's engineer, Warriner, made an 
examination of the Larson lands in August of 
1963 and made a report of his examination to 
Tosco. (TR-1, Pg. 80 L 12-27.) 
2. Larson advised Tosco, both orally and 
in writing, on numerous occasions, that the 
option granted Tosco expired on January 15, 
1964. (TR-1, Pg. 196 L 15-30; Pg. 197-all 
and Pg. 198 L 1-10.) (See also Pl's. Ex. 3 and 
Def's. Ex. 20 & 21.) 
K. In its description of events related in the 
second paragraph on Page 14 of its Brief, Tosco 
cites only evidence submitted by its witnesses con-
cerning the meeting between Larson and Tweedy in 
Beverly Hills on February 12, 1964. The testimony 
in this respect was conflicting and Larson testified 
that Tweedy attempted to obtain Larson's approval 
to a transaction completely different and foreign to 
the understandings expressed in the July Letter 
(TR-1, Pg. 28L10-30). 
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DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARG11. 
MENTS A AND B 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THE JULY LETTER. 
The contract alleged to exist by Tosco, consisting 
solely of the July Letter, is indefinite, incomplete and 
constitutes a mere agreement to agree. In a recent 
opinion, this Court set forth the requirements of an 
enforceable contract when it said in Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 ( 1967): 
Specific performance cannot be required un-
less all terms of the agreement are clear. The 
court cannot compel the performance of a con-
tract which the parties did not mutually agree 
upon. (Citing authority.) 
In speaking of certain terms required for spe-
cific performance, the author in 49 Arn. Jr., 
Specific Perf orrnance, Section 22, at Page 35 
uses this language : 
The contract must be free from doubt, 
vagueness and ambiguity, so as to leave 
nothing to conjecture or to be supplied by 
the court. It must be sufficiently certain 
and definite in its terms to leave no rea-
sonable doubt as to what the parties in-
tended, and no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have 
performed, and it must be sufficiently cer-
tain as to its terms so that the court may 
enforce it as actually made by the parties 
( 423 P.2d at 493). 
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This rule is especially applicable to complicated min-
ing industrial transactions. Anierican Mining Co. v. 
Him1'od-Kiniball Mines Co., 124 Colo. 186, 235 P.2d 
804 (1951). 
The1·e are at least three critical and essential 
omissions from the July Letter. These are ( i) the 
term of the mining lease contemplated by the parties, 
(ii) the form of conveyance which would have been 
required of Defendants if Tosco had elected to pur-
chase the claims and (iii) the clarification of the 
term "appropriate investment restrictions" which 
Defendants would have been required to give upon 
receipt of the Tosco stock. 
Of critical importance is the omission in the July 
Letter of the term of the lease. There is ample and 
conclusive authority for the proposition that a lease 
term is essential in a mining lease. For the sake of 
brevity, reference is made here only to two cases. 
The first is Martin v. Hall, 219 Cal. 234, 26 P.2d 288 
(1933). 
Appellant alleges execution of a written agree-
ment for a lease [oil and gas] on August 8, 
1928. The written agreement is not set forth 
haec verba in the answer and cross-complaint. 
As described by appellant it is uncertain, in-
definite, and incomplete, particularly in that 
it fails to fix a date for commencement of the 
lease or to fix any term of duration. (Citing 
authority.) (Emphasis supplied.) (26 P.2d 
at 290.) 
The second case is Warren v. Gary-Glendon Coal 
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Co., 313 Ky. 178, 230 S.vV. 2d 638 (1950). In that 
case the Big Jim Coal Company made two offers to 
Warren relative to certain coal lands. The second 
off er took the following form: 
Offer No. 2 September 19, 1946 
We offer to lease with the option to purchase 
the same properties mentioned in Offer No. 1 
at lOc per ton royalty on coal mined (1h of 
royalty to be put in escrow from the 131 acre 
tract). Minimum rental $100.00 per year. 
Option on the 131 acres $5,400.00 ( 1h to be 
put in escrow). Option on the balance $2,-
600.00 or a total of $8,000.00. Any royalties 
paid to apply on the purchase price if and 
when purchased. The right to use all the sur-
f ace and timber to be the same as if owned by 
us. No royalty to be paid on coal mined from· 
the tract of land lying on the watershed of 
Caney Creek, and if and when this tract is pur-
chased it is to be transferred in fee. 
The Hmvell ti·act where home is to be reser\'0d. 
This contract is to be written out in full later 
on as the final elaborate agreement between 
the parties. 
In adjudging that the second offer did not con-
stitute a contract which could be specifically enforced 
the Court stated: 
It is fundamental that in order to enable a 
court of equity to decree specific performance, 
the terms of the contract must be clear, defin-
ite, certain and complete .... 
When we apply the rules set out in the above 
paragraph to this loosely drawn and indefinite 
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instrument, it is manifest that it is not the 
character of contract that a court of equity 
will specifically enforce. The tinie it was to 
begin and to end was not stated ... (Emphasis 
supplied.) (230 S.W. 2d at 640) 
In opposition to the argument that the lease 
must have a definite term, Tosco relied upon D.A.C. 
Uranium Co. v. Benton, 149 F. Supp. 667 (Dist. Colo. 
l 956), during arguments to the Trial Court. The 
lease before the court in Benton had a definite term, 
i.e., the lease was to continue so long as the property 
was developed during six months of each year. It is 
significant that the court in Benton quoted as follows 
from Carlson v. Bain, 116 Colo. 526, 182 P.2d 909 
( 1947) : 
We have said that under the Authorities, to 
create a valid contract of lease but few points 
of mutual agreement are necessary; first, 
there must be a definite agreement as to the 
extent and bonds of the property lease; second, 
a definite and agreed term; ... (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The July letter is silent as to the form of convey-
ance with which the Defendants would convey the 
claims if Tosco had elected to exercise the option 
to purchase. Was the conveyance to be made by quit 
claim deed or deed with warranty or without war-
ranty? In any transaction involving real estate, the 
form of conveyance is critically important. See, for 
example, Venino v. Naegle, 99 N.J. Eq. 183, 131 Atl. 
895 (1926), wherein the Court of Chancery in re-
fusing to decree specific performance stated: 
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In the document unde1· examination it \Viii 
have been observed that many of the usual 
provisions of contracts for the pm·chase and 
sale of real estate are omitted. As was point-
ed out in the opinion in the Tansey case, it 
does not disclose what all the terms of the 
formal agreement were to be; neither does it 
specify whether or not it was to contain pro-
visions for default of payment of inte1·est and 
taxes. No rnention is made of the charactel' 
of deeds by which the title was to be conveyed. 
These defects I feel are fatal to the complaint-
ant's suit. (Emphasis supplied.) (131 Atl. at 
895.) 
If Tosco had elected to exercise the option to 
lease the Larson lands, Tosco would have then been 
obligated to deliver 5,000 shares of its common stock 
to the Defendants. 
Subject to delivery to it [Tosco] of appropriate 
ini•est?nent representations from the recipients 
and subject to such other terms and conditions 
as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be re-
quired for compliance with the Federal Securi-
ties Laws. (July 25 portion of July Letter, 
Pl's. Ex. 2, p. 2.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
There is no evidence in the record to clarify or 
indicate the meaning of "appropriate investment 
representations." 
No authorities have been discovered which de-
fine the term "appropriate investment representa-
tions.' The noted authority, Words and Phrases, 
omits the phrase entirely. 
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It is clear that investment i·epresentations by 
the Defendants to Tosco would be a very material 
consideration from the viewpoint uf both parties. 
However, the absence of language in the July Letter 
which would define or indicate what the representa-
tions would be, how they would operate, and the 
length of time during which such representations 
would be effective, constitutes a further significant 
omission. 
The essential omissions notwithstanding, it is 
clear that the July Letter, in and of itself alone, con-
stituted a mere agreement to agree and could not, 
therefore, serve as the basis for a decree of specific 
performance. In the Restatement, Contracts, § 26, 
Comment A ( 1957), the authors state: 
Parties who plan to make a final written in-
strument as the expression of their contract, 
necessarily discuss the proposed terms of the 
contract before they enter into it and often, 
before the final writing is made, agree upon 
all the terms which they plan to incorporate 
therein. This they may do orally or by ex-
change of several writings. It is possible thus 
to make a contract to execute subsequently a 
final writing which shall contain certain pro-
visions. If parties have definitely agreed that 
they will do so, and that the final writing shall 
contain these provisions and no others, they 
have then fulfilled all the requisites for the 
formation of a contract. 011 the other hand, if 
the preliniinary agreement is inc01nplete, it 
being apparent that the deterrnination of cer-
tain details is deferred until the writing is 
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made out; or if an intention is manifested 
in any way that legal obligations between the 
parties shall be deferred until the writing is 
made, the preliminary negotiations and agree-
nients do not constitute a contract. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The fact that the July Letter, in and of itself 
alone, constituted only an agreement to agree clearly 
appears from the document itself. The July 25 por-
tion of the July Letter provides: 
In conversations held between Mr. Frederick 
H. Larson, who was in telephone contact with 
Mr. Fred V. Larson, and who was represent-
ing the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., and 
Mr. Koolsbergen and various members of the 
Tosco staff in New York on July 9 and 10, 
as recorded in Mr. Albert F. Lenhardt's memo-
randum of July 11, and a subsequent meeting 
on July 24 in Los Angeles, the understandings 
described below applicable to the holdings of 
Larson Oil Co. were reached. The purpose of 
this letter is to state the iritention of Tosco 
and the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., as 
nwdified on July 24, to hereafter enter into 
contracts and agreements gi'uing expression 
to those understandings as they pertain to 
the holdings of Larson Oil Co . ... (Emphasis 
supplied) 
I have asked our attorneys to commence the 
drafting of the necessary documents to carry 
out these understandings and reduce them 
to formal agreements and would appreciate 
your prompt reply. 
What clearer indication could there be that the 
parties had not completed negotiations and agree-
14 
men ts as to all aspects of the subject transaction? 
The evidence adduced during trial conclusively dem-
onstrates that the parties had not reached final agree-
ment as of July 25, 1963. 
Koolsbergen described the practice of Tosco in 
purchasing mining properties, which was utilized 
in this case, as follows : 
·when we contemplate going in to acquire re-
serves, real property, before we decide to 
spend a lot of time and put money in on draft-
ing docunients, and putting people to work and 
preparing agreements, we want to to take a 
quick look sometimes for the very simple rea-
son to see if the properties are there. ( Empha-
sis supplied.) 
The second thing is, is it worthwhile to contin-
ue the next step, which is the negotiation of 
the contract. (Emphasis supplied.) (TR-1 p. 
78,L17-25.) 
Pursuant to this practice, Tosco had a cursory 
examination of the properties made by Mr. Warriner, 
of De Witt, Smith & Company in August of 1963 (TR-
1 p. 80 at L 12-17), i.e., one month after execution 
of the July 25, 1963 memorandum. 
·with reference to the July Letter (Pl's. Ex. 2), 
Koolsbergen further testified: 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, but so far as you and Mr. Larson 
were concerned, and the other Larsons, 
there was no agreement as to the term 
of the lease? 
There was no agreement as to term, be-
15 
cause that was supposed to be negotiated 
in the option agreement and subsequently. 
(TR-1, p. 83, L. 26-30.) 
With reference to a title examination of the 
Larson properties, Tweedy testified: 
The memorandum of July 25 provided an 
agreement between the parties as to what the 
option might contain, but further provided 
that drafts would be prepared setting forth the 
terms and transactions. I would not have 
undertaken the very extensive process of ex-
amining titles to 30,000 acres of unpatented 
oil shale claims without having assured myself 
that there was an agreement between my client 
and the optionor. (TR-1, p. 114, L. 4-13). 
With reference to the formula set forth in the 
July Letter, Tweedy was of the opinion that a stated 
purchase price would be to the benefit of both par-
ties, and that such could be determined in the course 
of negotiations: 
Yes, it [July 25, 1963 memorandum] contain-
ed a formula, and I think that I suggested to 
Mr. Dufford, that it might be better if we 
could get the parties, in the course of negotia-
tion, to come up with a specified dollar amount. 
(TR-1 p. 133 at L. 15-18.) (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
As further indication that the July Letter was 
not complete as far as Tosco was concerned, the 
testimony of Tweedy with regard to warranties and 
form of conveyance is important: 
[vVith reference to the drafts which were pre-
16 
pared], we have some provisions here for the 
form of deed and again representations and 
warranties. I wanted to get from Mr. Larson 
more representations and walTanties than 
Mr. Dufford wanted Mr. Larson to give. (TR-
1p.133 at L 21-36.) 
vVith reference to Larson's refusal to execute 
the drafts prepared by Tweedy in February, Tweedy 
testified: 
Q. Actually there was no specific instrument 
in existence that he [Larson] assured you 
that he would sign, 
A. That is correct; you and I had not finish-
ed negotiations. (Emphasis supplied.) 
(TR-1p.148 at L. 8-12.) 
Most important is the testimony of Koolsbergen 
during Tosco's case in chief relative to the July 
Letter: 
Q. But is it your position that with respect 
to the Larson-Oil Shale Lease, July 25, 
1963, that that memorandum created no 
binding agreement? 
A. I am not a lawyer. To me it was a docu-
ment which was offered, it contained the 
terms of an offer, and so far as I was 
concerned, we were not bound and he 
was not bound until the document was 
signed. We never in our life go into an 
extensive transaction with just a one 
or two page memorandum especially 
when you deal with people who are either 
not interested enough to enter a trans-
action, to really understand it, and that 
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is why I always insist that complete 
documents are being prepared, which are 
understood by counsel and understood hv 
the parties and then they are signed, not 
before. 
Q. This never happened then in connection 
with the Larson transaction? 
A. That never happened. 
Q. You never got what you called a complete 
agreement, understood by counsel and 
the parties, that was signed? 
A. No, I was told by Mr. Tweedy, that we 
could expect such an agreement. (TR-1 
p. 170 at L. 26-30; p. 170 at L. 1-18). 
As conclusively demonstrating that the parties 
never did reach an agreement based upon the July 
Letter, and that many areas which the parties con-
sidered essential were to be negotiated, one need only 
refer and compare the drafts of Tweedy ( Pl's. Ex. 
14, 16, 17 & 18) and Larson's counsel (Pl's Ex. 17 
& 18) with the July Letter. At this point, reference 
is made only to the disagreements of the parties as 
evidenced by the various drafts, i.e.,: 
1. There was no agreement as to a lease term; 
2. There was no agreement as to whether stock 
would be exchanged or cash in lieu thereof; 
3. There was no agreement as to the procedure 
to be utilized in connection with acquisition of pat-
ents; 
4. There was no agreement as to whether title 
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documentation would be certified or uncertified; 
5. There was no agreement as to the purchase 
price to be paid in the event an option to purchase 
was exercised; 
6. There was no agreement as to the terms of 
payment for the purchase price in the event the op-
tion to purchase was exercised; and 
7. There was no agreement as to the warran-
ties to be made by Larson in connection with the con-
veyance of the Larson properties, nor the form such 
conveyance was to take. 
The contract as alleged by Tosco being incom-
plete and a mere agreement to agree, there is no basis 
whatsoever for a decree of specific performance. 
B. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUSTAINS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE OP-
TION PERIOD COMMENCED JULY 15, 1963 
AND ENDED JANUARY 15, 1964. 
Tosco concedes in its Brief that the parties on 
July 11, 1963 agreed that the option period would 
commence July 15, 1963 and terminate January 15, 
1964 (Tosco Brief, p. 5). This same oral understand-
ing was confirmed by the parties subsequent to the 
letter of July 25, 1963 as conclusively evidenced by 
the following: 
1. Larson testified that this was a clear under-
standing of the parties both on July 11and25, 1963; 
(TR-1 p. 24 at L 17; p. 33 at L 1; p. 186 at L 8); 
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2. The July Letter involves two transactions, 
closely related, i.e., terms proposed for acquisition 
of the Larson holdings, and, Larson'8 efforts to se-
cure contiguous properties for Tosco. It is evident 
that the parties intended to initiate their efforts on 
both phases of the transaction as soon as possible. 
For the sake of brevity, only one quotation is taken 
from the July 11 portion of the July Letter: 
In addition [to the Larson holdings] there are 
about 15 small parcels of patented shale lands 
contiguous to the Larson and Skyline proper-
ties and totaling about 14,000 acres ... Mr. 
Larson feels he could put the parcels together 
in a single package again for Tosco. Tinie is 
of the essence, however, since three or four 
approaches have been nwde to some of these 
people in the past few weeks. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
Although no commencement date for Larson's em-
ployment is stated in the July Letter, Larson com-
menced employment on July 15, 1963 and concluded 
his employment on July 15, 1964, and was paid on 
that basis by Tosco; (TR-1 p. 47 at L 9-11). 
3. The drafts prepared by Tweedy on July 18, 
1963 after consultation with Koolsbergen (TR-1 p. 
85 at L. 5-12) specifically provided that the ~rms 
of the option to lease would be from July 15, 19!33 to 
January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex. 15 & 16). 
4. Options and Leases prepared by Lai '.m's 
counsel and mailed to Tweedy and Tosco on or al mt 
December 13, 1963 specified the same beginning a id 
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ending dates for the period of the option to lease, i.e., 
from January 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964. (Pl's 
Ex. 4 & 5). 
5. The drafts prepared by Tweedy as late as 
Febmary 11, 1964 (Pl's. Exs. 17 & 18), and pre-
sented by Tweedy to Larson during the latter part 
of February, 1964, specifically provided that the op-
tion period would commence as of July 15, 1963 and 
encl January 15, 1964. 
6. Larson advised Tosco on numerous occa-
sions of his understanding that the option period 
commenced July 15, 1963 and ended on January 15, 
1964. At no time did Tosco object to Larson's inter-
pretation or attempt to contradict same, until the 
telephone conversation between Tweedy and Larson 
in February of 1964 and after the expiration of the 
option period. In fact, Koolsbergen wrote to Fred-
erick V. Larson by letter dated August 3, 1963 ex-
pressing his pleasure at the agreement of the parties: 
I am delighted to arrive with you and your as-
sociates at an agreement concerning the lands 
owned by you and the Larson Oil Company. 
These lands will be a significant contribution 
to the oil shale industry in the West. I am 
hopeful that you, yourself, will be able to as-
sist us in arriving at a plan for the best utili-
,' zation of the Larson oil shale lands. I hope 
that you will be able to provide the necessary 
guidance to our attorneys and engineers in 
,, bringing the property into production. 
1
' I am also hopeful that you will be able to go to 
Denver and assist in presenting testimony 
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regarding your early experience in the oil 
shale lands. Such testimony will help us to 
bring the lands to patent. (Emphasis sup-
plied). (Defs'. Ex. 24.) 
7. Notices of Larson's position as to the ter-
mination of the option period were transmitted to 
Tosco by Larson's memorandums of November 21, 
1963 (Def's. Ex. 20 & 21) and his memorandum of 
December 13, 1963 (Def's. Ex. 3). The November 21 
memorandum stated: 
If the option to lease is exercise on January 
15, 1964, Tosco will be obigated to convey 2,-
500 shares of Tosco stock 1,250 shares to Fred-
erick H. Larson and 1,250 shares to Dorothy 
H. Larson). (Emphasis supplied.) 
The December 13 memorandum stated: 
Enclosed are copies of Option and Lease on the 
Fred V. Larson patented lands and copies of 
Option and Lease on the Frederick H. Larson 
unpatented lands. . . . 
Under the terms of our agreement, my fa th er 
and mother will be entitled to $10,000.00 at the 
time of signing the leases. . . . 
The enclosed option and lease referred to contained 
a commencement and termination date for the option 
of July 15, 1963 and January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex. 
4 & 5). 
8. On January 14, 1964 Lenhardt, while in 
New York City at the Tosco offices, called Larson 
and acknowledged that the Tosco option expired 
January 15, 1964 and also requested of Larson an 
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extension of the option period (TR-1 p.198 L. 14-30). 
Larson refused to grant the extension and Lenhardt 
then told Larson that Tosco would try to pay the 
$20,000.00 as soon as it had the funds. (TR-1 p. 199 
L. 1-4). The testimony in this regard was uncontra-
clicted. 
9. Larson received a letter from Tosco dated 
.January 16, 1964 requesting him to advise S. D. 
Leidesdorf & Co., auditors for Tosco, of any amount 
clue Larson as of December 31, 1963 (Def's. Ex. 23). 
Larson answered this inquiry advising that Tosco 
was indebted to the Defendants in the amount of 
$20,000.00 as consideration for the options which 
expired on January 15, 1964 (Def's. Ex. 25). 
10. On or about January 31, 1964, Tosco paid 
the Defendants the $20,000.00 by four separate 
checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) each in the amount of $5,000.00. 
Checks to Frederick V. and Ethyl B. Larson had a 
notation showing that it was issued for "options 
granted," and each check was signed by Koolsbergen 
and Joseph A. Marks, treasurer of Tosco. Kools-
bergen acknowledged that the checks were prepared 
before he signed them (TR-1 p. 97 L. 1-8). On 
February 3, 1964 the treasurer of Tosco wrote to 
Larson (Def's. Ex. 10) requesting that Larsen ac-
knowledge receipt of the four Tosco checks which 
were paid by Tosco "pursuant to the agreement." 
11. As late as March 23, 1964, in a memo-
randum prepared by by Winston, Tosco's counsel, 
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reference was made to disputes arising out of the op-
tion agreement dated July 15, 1963. (Def's. Ex. 19). 
In light of the foregoing, it is critical to analyze 
Tosco's contention that there is insufficient evidence 
to support the Trial Court's findings. 
Tosco contends that Larson's testimony is in-
credible (Tosco's Brief p. 21-22). The Trial Court 
had the opportunity to assess the conduct and appear-
ances of the witness on the stand, the reasonableness 
of the testimony, the accuracy of the recollection of 
each witness, and to analyze the inclination of each 
witness to speak the truth; the Trial Court obviously 
believed the testimony of Larsen and did not believe 
the testimony of Koolsbergen and Tweedy. 
Tosco then has the audacity to state, with refer-
ence to the option period, 
There is not a single, solitary contemporaneous 
document proving, or even tending to support, 
the existence of the oral agreement claimed by 
Defendants. No letter, no memorandum, no 
note, no diary entry; nothing in evidence prior 
to Defendants' February 1964 repudiation of 
their contractual obligation states that the op-
tion commenced to run in July, or at any other 
time prior to the time clearly and expressly 
provided in the July 25 written agreement. 
(Tosco Brief, p. 21). 
Tosco thus ignores and attempts to obscure con-
tents of the documents referred to in paragraphs 
numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, supra. 
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This Court has stated on numerous occasions 
that when there is competent evidence in the record 
to support the Trial Court's findings, such findings 
will not be set aside on appeal. See e.g., Pitcher v. 
Lcrnritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d, 491 (1967). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF ORAL AGREEMENTS AS TO 
THE OPTION PERIOD. 
1. Parol evidence is admissible to show the 
effective date of a contract. 
Even though parol evidence as to the effective 
date of a contract conflicts with the date shown on 
the contract, such evidence is admissible as affirmed 
by this Court on at least two occasions: General In-
snrance Co. v. Henich, 13 Utah 2d 231, 371 P.2d 642 
(1962); Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 
( 1948). In the latter case, this Court stated: 
Plaintiff, in making a tender of proof, testi-
fied that the contract was not signed on the 
date shown in the instrument. 
An exception is recognized to the parol evi-
dence rule in the case of dates upon instru-
ments. It is said that the rule that parol evi-
dence cannot be received to contradict a writ-
tent contract does not apply to the date, which 
may be contradicted whenever it is material 
to the issues to do so, or, if lacking, may be 
supplied by parol or other competent testi-
mony. (200 P.2d at 737) 
Testimony showing the agreed commencement date 
of the option (July 15, 1963) is in effect evidence 
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to show the date that the contract became effective. 
2. Parol evidence is admissible because the 
July Letter is only a letter of intent. 
The authorities uniformly agree that when a 
memorandum represents only statements related to a 
proposed transaction and does not constitute the 
entire agreement, parol evidence is admissible to 
show the complete agreement. As stated in Restate-
ment, Contracts,§ 228, Comment a (1937): 
It is an essential of an integration that the 
parties shall have manifested assent not mere-
ly to the provisions of their agreement, but to 
the writing or writings in question as a final 
statement of their intentions as to the matter 
contained therein. If such assent is manifested 
the writing may be a letter, telegram or other 
informal document. That a document was or 
was not adopted as an integration may be 
proved by any relevant evidence. 
The July Letter itself reflects that it is a mere 
letter of intent: 
The purpose of this letter is to state the inten-
tion of TOSCO and the shareholders of Larson 
Oil Co., as modified on July 24, to hereafter 
enter into contracts and agreements giving ex-
pression to those understandings as they per-
tain to the holdings of Larson Oil Co. 
Larson testified that he and Tweedy agreed there 
were many terms in the transaction which were to be 
negotiated subsequent to the preparation of the July 
Letter. (TR-1p.187 L. 23-30; p. 188 L.1-2.) Kools-
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bergen testified that the terms of the lease were to be 
negotiated subsequently. (TR-1 p. 83 L. 26-30.) A 
comparison of the drafts prepared by the parties 
readily shows that negotiations took place as to the 
various material terms. (See Pl's. Ex. 14 & 16; com-
pare, Pl's. Ex. 4 & 5 and Pl's. Ex. 17 & 18.) 
The July Letter, being a mere letter of intent, 
parol evidence was admissible to show the option 
period, July 15, 1963 through January 15, 1964. 
3. Parol evidence is admissible to show addi-
tional terms of the tramaction. 
The Court has recognized on at least two occa-
sions that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show 
additional terms of a contract not included in the 
written agreement. See Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 
10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960); Farr v. Was-
atch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 
( 1943). In the latter case, this Court stated: 
To sustain this ruling of the Court that the 
evidence of this prior collateral agreement was 
incompetent, counsel invokes the rule that 
parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, 
add to, or vary the terms of a written instru-
ment. The rule is, of course well established 
but it has no application here. The problem 
of ascertaining when the rule applies to a 
given fact situation is discussed by Wigmore, 
Sec. 2430 of his work on evidence. It is there 
stated: 'The inquiry is whether the writing 
was intended to cover a certain subject of ne-
gotiation; for if it was not, then the writing 
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does not embody the transaction on that sub-
ject* * *. ( 143 P.2d at 282.) 
The July Letter provides : 
1. Tosco will pay $20,000.00 at the time of 
signing of the agreement ($10,000.00 to 
Fred V. and Ethel B. Larson, his wife; 
and $10,000.00 to Frederick H. Larson 
and Dorothy H. Larson, his wife) and will 
receive in turn a six-month option during 
which it will examine the title, history 
and status of the mining claims, the feasi-
bility of patent proceedings and he extent 
and minability of the reserves. 
Tosco interprets this provision as meaning that the 
period of the option did not commence until execution. 
of the formal agreements and payment of the $20,-
000.00 by Tosco. However, the only interpretation 
which is justified by careful reading of that provi-
sion, is that Tosco was to pay $20,000.00 for which 
it would receive an option on the Larson lands for 
a period of six months. The beginning and ending 
dates of the option period are not specified in that 
provision, and the agreement of the parties as to the 
option term constitutes an additional provision of 
the transaction. 
4. Parol evidence is admisible to show the 
meaning of indefinite, vague and ambigu-
ous provisions of a contract. 
This Court has recognized that when the terms 
of a contract are indefinite and vague, parol evidence 
and subsequent writings of the parties are admissible 
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to show the meaning of indefinite terms. In Contin-
ental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 
P2d 773 ( 1957), this Court stated: 
The sole question before this court, then, is 
whether the parties intended by this agree-
ment that respondent should assume the obli-
gation on the note held by Continental Bank. 
This intent should be ascertained first from 
the four corners of the instrument itself, sec-
ond from other contemporaneous writings con-
cerning the same subject matter, and third 
from the extrinsic parol evidence of the inten-
tions. (Citing authority.) If the ambiguity 
can be reconciled from a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the instrument, extrinsic evidence 
should not be allowed. (Citing authority.) If 
the instrument on its face remains ambiguous 
in spite of the reasonable construction, the in-
ent may be ascertained in the light of all writ-
ten instruments which were a part of the same 
transaction. (Citing authority.) If the intent 
is ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be 
admitted, (Citing authority) and rules of con-
struction may be invoked to declare the inten-
tion of the parties. (Citing authority.) 
Tosco has, in effect, selected one sentence from 
the July Letter which serves as the sole basis for their 
contention in this case that the option never started 
to wit: 
1. Tosco will pay $20,000 at the time of sign-
ing the agreements ... and will receive 
in turn a six-month option ... 
If this interpretation of the July Letter were 
correct, until formal documents were signed and the 
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.,.20,000.00 paid, there was no obligation on the part 
of either party to do anything, and, there was no con. 
1,ractual relationship whatsoever. To the contrary, 
this is obviously not what the parties intended, and 
.this conclusion is apparent without any reference 
.to the acts of the parties subsequent to July 25, 1963. 
The July 11 portion of the Letter states: 
Meetings were held with Mr. Frederick H 
Larson representing the Larson Oil Co., and 
the TOSCO staff on July 9th and 10th to dis-
cuss the acquisition of oil shale properties 
owned by Larson Oil Co. and the acquisition o.f 
a number of snwll parcels of Ufoh shale lands 
located in the vicinity of the Larson properties . 
. . . Their holdings [Larson] consist of ap· 
proximately 30,000 acres of unpatented shale 
lands and 1,000 acres of patented lands lying 
to the north and partially to the east of the 
Sky line property in Utah. 
In addition, there ai·e about 15 small parceb 
of patented shale lands contiguous to the Lar· 
son and Sky line properties and totaling abou: 
14,000 acres ... Mr. Larson feels he could put 
the pa1·cels together in a single package agair. 
for TOSCO. Time is of the essence, however 
since three or four approaches have been nuu/1 
to some of these people in the past few weeki 
. . . (Pl's. Ex. 2, July 11P.1) 
. . . Mr. Larson will be employed as a consul· 
tant by TOSCO for up to one year at $1,200.01 
per month plus expenses. During this ti1ni 
he will work toward assembling the smol 
parcels into a single package and assist i:i tl1• 
work involved in patenting the Larson Oil 0 
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lands . . . (Emphasis supplied.) ( Pl's. Ex. " 
July 11, P. 4.) 
At the conclusion of the July 25 portion of th 
Letter, the following appears: 
I have asked our attorneys to commence tht 
drafting of the necessary documents to carry 
out these understandings and reduce them to 
formal agreements and would appreciate your 
prompt reply. 
It is therefore clear that acquisition of the Lar-
son holdings and the acquisition of surrounding acre-
age was of utmost importance to Tosco, and it was 
imperative to initiate efforts to accomplish both 
ends immediately. When this obvious interpretation 
of the July Letter is compared to the one sentence of 
that letter upon which Tosco bases its whole case, at 
best, the one sentence becomes vague, indefinite and 
ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence was clearly ad-
missible to show the intent of the parties as to the 
commencement and ending dates of the option. 
D. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO APPLICA-
TION TO EXECUTED AGREEMENTS. 
Tosco complains that the Trial Court's Findings 
as to the option period violate the Utah Statute of 
Frauds. Section 25-5-3, U.C.A. 1953. Tosco fails 
to consider that the July Letter, as supplemented by 
the oral agreements of the parties and their subse-
quent conduct, constituted an agreement which was 
, fully performed by both Tosco and the Defendants. 
The Statute of Frauds had no application to a fully 
31 
executed contract. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 
161, 128 P.2d282 (1942); Cutright v. Union Savings 
& Investment Co., 33 Utah 486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908). 
Here, briefly stated, the Trial Court correctly deter-
mined that Defendants granted Tosco a six-month 
option to lease their lands. The agreed term of the 
option was from July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964. 
Tosco agreed to pay $20,000.00 as consideration for 
the option. Tosco did not elect to exercise the option 
and paid the $20,000.00 consideration. 
E. TOSCO DOES NOT ACTUALLY SEEK A DECREE 
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AS TO THE JULY 
LETTER, BUT A DECREE REQUIRING DEFEND-
ANTS TO EXECUTE INSTRUMENTS PREPARED 
BY LARSON'S COUNSEL, AS AMENDED BY 
COURT DECREE, AND THE COURT CANNOT 
MAKE A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that the July 25, 
1963 letter is a complete and enforceable contract, 
but then asks the Court not to enforce the July 25 
Letter, as such, but to order Defendants to execute 
instruments in the form of Appendix B to its Brief, 
which would require execution by Defendants of 
documents composed by the Court, not the parties 
to the transaction. It is difficult to understand Plain-
tiff's position in this regard. In the final analysis, 
the Plaintiffs now literally ask the Court to enforce 
a document, the material provisions of which they 
rejected in January and February of 1964 and which 
is, in fact, an instrument as to which the Court would 
supply the majority of the terms. To illustrate, the 
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< )ption and Mining Lease irelating to unpatented 
claims (See Appendix B - Pgs. 2b to 29b of Plain-
tiff's Brief) contains a multitude of provisions which 
were not even discussed in the July Letter. The Op-
tion portions of these instruments contain not less 
than nine separate subjects. Of the total subjects 
discussed in the Options, only three were even re-
motely covered by the July Letter. The proposed 
Leases in Appendix B to Tosco's Brief cover no less 
than 20 different provisions, of which only six were 
specified in the July Letter. Further, of the six pro-
visions specified in the July Letter, all of them have 
been amplified considerably to remove the ambigui-
ties, defects and omissions inherent therein. This 
Court has consistently refused to supply missing ele-
ments of a contract in order to make a complete trans-
action for the parties involved. Hargreaves v. Burton, 
G9 Utah 575, 206 Pac. 262 (1922); see also Pitcher 
v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967); 
Price 'V. Lloyd, 31Utah86, 86 Pac. 76 7 (1906). 
The absurdity of Tosco's present offer (Tosco 
Brief, p. 19) to execute an option and lease in the 
form of Appendix B to its Brief, becomes obvious 
by an analysis of the documents prepared by Tweedy 
in February of 1964 (Pl's Ex. 17 & 18) which 
graphically demonstrates Tosco's complete rejection 
of the July Letter and the attempts of Larson to 
finalize the parties transaction. 
ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 17 and 18 
Tweedy prepared two separate sets of instru-
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ments about February 11, 1964. The instruments 
were introduced in evidence by Tosco and identified 
as Plantiff's Exhibits 17 and 18. One set of instru-
ments (Pl's. Ex. 17) related to the Larson patented 
lands and consisted of an "Option" to which was 
attached and incorporated, as Exhibit "A," an in-
strument to be executed upon exercise of the option 
to lease. Exhibit "A" was entitled, "Mining Lease 
and Option to Purchase." The other set of instru-
ments (Pl's. Ex. 18) also consisted of an Option 
with the Mining Lease and Option to Purchase at-
tached and incorporated as Exhibit "A." Since this 
section relates primarily to a discussion of Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 17 and 18, the options to lease will be re-
ferred to in this paragraph as "Option" or "Options" 
and the leases attached as Exhibits "A" will be re-
ferred to as "Lease" or "Leases." These Options and 
Leases were the drafts which Tweedy discussed with 
Larson in California about February 15, 1964. (TR-
1 p. 138 L-25-30; p. 139 L 1.) 
Tosco would have the Court believe that the Op-
tions and Leases which were presented to Larson for 
consideration on or about February 15, 1964, em-
bodied those few definite understandings which were 
related in the July Letter. (Tosco Brief, Page 14, 
first paragraph.) However, analysis of those instru-
ments discloses a complete departure from the July 
Letter in certain respects. To illustrate: 
A. The July Letter (Pg. 2-July 25 portion) 
provides: 
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If it elects to lease, it will, at the time of the 
election, deliver to Fred V. Larson and Ethel 
B. Larson, his wife, 2500 shares of its author-
ized, but unissued, common stock and simul-
taneously deliver to Frederick H. Larson and 
Dorothy H. Larson, his wife, 2500 shares of 
its authorized but unissued, common stock ... 
The Options and Leases deprived Defendants of said 
shares. 
B. The July Letter (Pg. 2, July 25 portion 
thereof) provides for payment of delay rental of 
$10,000.000 per year for the unpatented claims. The 
Option and Lease (Pl's. Ex. 18) relating to un-
patented claims also deprives Defendants of this pay-
ment. 
C. The July Letter, (Pg. 2-July 25 portion) 
provides that "Tosco will have the right to drop any 
of the unpatented claims which it deems to be un-
patentable or uneconomical, but the shareholders 
shall have the right to attempt to carry to patent any 
claims so dropped by Tosco," but the July Letter 
makes no provision for any reduction of the $10,-
000.00 rental payment if claims are relinquished. 
However, the Option and Lease (Pl's. Ex. 17) which 
relate to the unpatented claims, contain a provision 
for ratable reduction of the annual delay rental pay-
ment of $10,000.00, if any of the unpatented claims 
are relinquished by Tosco. (See Paragraph 3.2.4 -
Lease.) 
D. The July Letter is silent as to warranties 
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or representations concerning Defendants' title to 
the Larson lands. Yet, the Options and Leases would 
have required the Defendants to give complete and 
unrestricted representations and warranties as to the 
validity of their title. (See Paragraph 9 of Options 
and Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Leases.) Further, 
in Paragraph 19.2 of the Option and Lease relating 
to the unpatented areas, Tweedy would have requi1·ed 
the Defendants to execute a completely erroneous and 
untrue statement, i.e. : 
19.2 Patent applications have been pre-
pared in proper form, executed by the proper 
parties and filed with the appropriate agency 
of the Department of Interim· of the United 
States of America in connection with the 
claims listed in Schedule 1 of Exhibit "A." 
E. The July Letter is completely devoid of any 
provision as to the form of conveyance to be utilized 
by Defendants in the event Tosco elected to exercise 
the purchase option contemplated by Paragraph 7 of 
the July Letter. However, the Options and Leases 
would have the Defendants convey the patented prop-
erties by a general warranty deed (Paragraph 17-
Lease-Pl's. Ex. 17) and the unpatented claims by 
special warranty deed. (Paragraph 18.3-Lease-
Pl's. Ex. 18.) 
F. The July Letter does not ex em pt Tosco from 
obligation to produce minerals from the Larson lands 
in the event it exercised its option to lease. The 
Leases, however, contain the following provision: 
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15. Obligation to Produce - No state-
ment contained in this Lease shall be con-
strued by implication or otherwise to obligate 
Lessee to mine or produce any shale oil or 
other metal 01· metalliferous substances from 
the Leased Lands during the term hereof or 
any extensions or renewals. 
This is paiticularly onerous, when coupled with the 
40 year lease terms which Tosco would have required 
as a condition to execution of the formal agreements. 
(Leases - Paragraphs 2.) (TR-1Pg.130 L 8-10.) 
G. The Leases would require the Defendants 
to submit their lands to Tosco for a period of 40 
years "and as long thereafter as Lease Minerals can 
be produced from the Leased Lands, or any part 
thereof, in commercial quantities." (Leases - Para-
graphs 2.) The July Letter contains no provision for 
the term of the mineral lease which would be eff ec-
tive upon the exercise of its option by Tosco. If this 
case did not involve such serious subjects, the pros-
pects of Tosco's insistence upon a 40 year lease term, 
its withdrawal of the $10,000.00 annual delay rental 
provision and its exemption of any obligation to de-
velop or produce, might provide some amusing specu-
lation as to the plight of the Defendants. 
H. The July 25 Letter has no provision con-
cerning abstracts or other title data. However, Para-
graph 3 of the Options would require the Defendants 
to obtain and deliver to Tosco, without compensation, 
currently certified abstracts of title, covering all the 
Larson lands which were the subject matter of the 
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Options. (See Paragraph 3 - Options.) In addition, 
Paragraph 3 of the Options would compel the De-
fendants to deliver to Tosco, without compensation, 
all title data, engineering reports and data, patent 
applications and other documents. 
I. The July Letter has no provision remotely 
suggesting a so-called "Lesser Interest" clause. How-
ever, the Leases provide (Paragraph 10) that if the 
Lessor [Defendants] owns less than the entire and 
undivided fee estate in the Leased Claims, a propor-
tionate reduction would be made in all payments 
otherwise due the the Defendants under such Leases. 
Insertion of the Lesser Interest clause in the Lease 
relating to the unpatented claims (since it relates to 
the "entire and undivided fee estate") would have the 
effect of nullifying any payments otherwise due the 
Defendants under the Lease, at least until the claims 
were patented. 
J. In addition to the omissions and conflicts 
discussed above, the Leases contained numerous other 
provisions which were not specified in the July 
Letter. 
Larson's rejection of the Tweedy drafts of Feb-
ruary 11, 1964 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 and 18) is 
the act which Tosco relied upon to accuse him of 
repudiating the transaction. (TR-1 Pg. 144 L 13-
28.) It becomes readily apparent that he was given 
no choice, but to reject the documents offered. 
Tosco will undoubtedly argue that several provi-
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sions in the Options and Leases were taken directly 
from instruments prepared by Larson's counsel in 
December of 1963 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 & 5). In 
part, this is a correct statement. However, it must be 
kept in mind that Plaintiff's Exhibit' 4 and 5 were 
prepared by Larson and his counsel in an attempt to 
successfully conclude the transaction contemplated 
by the July Letter and supplemental oral agreements 
and to off er Tosco a formal agreement which it would 
exercise with possibly minor changes. 
A vital element to be considered in consideration 
of this dispute is the fact that Tosco, at least until it 
filed its Brief with the Court, had never offered to 
execute any instrument which embodied the material 
provisions of the July Letter (TR-1Pg.144 L 13-18). 
II. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARGU-
MENT C. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS 4 AND 5 
AND FINDINGS 4, 5 & 7 ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Tosco contends that the Trial Court erred in 
reaching Conclusions of Law numbered 4 and 5 and 
Findings of Fact numbered 4, 5 and 7, because the 
evidence does not justify such conclusions and find-
ings. Conclusions of Law numbered 4 and 5 are: 
4. Having permitted the option period 
to expire, the Plaintiff is not now entitled to 
an order of this Court adjudging that Plaintiff 
is entitled to an additional six months option 
covering the Larson lands. 
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5. Judgment should be entered herein 
dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and 
providing that Defendants are entitled to re-
cover their costs of suit incurred therein. 
Tosco also asserts that Findings of Fact numbered 
4 and 5 are contrary to the plain language of the July 
Letter. Finding No. 4 is: 
4. When they executed Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 2, the parties intended to prepare and 
execute formal instruments expressing the 
complete and entire transaction which they 
contemplated. Plaintiff agreed to prepare such 
formal instruments and submit them to the 
Defendants for their consideration. 
Finding No. 4 is supported by the evidence and 
is not contrary to the language of the July Letter. 
An examination of the July Letter dispenses with 
Tosco's position in this regard. The letter states 
that its purpose is: 
... to state the intention of Tosco and 
the shareholders of Larson Oil Co., as modified 
on July 24, to hereafter enter into contracts 
and agreements giving expression to those 
understandings as they pertain to the holdings 
of Larson Oil Co. (Emphasis supplied.) (See 
Page 1 of the July Letter.) 
The last paragraph of the July Letter provides: 
I have asked our attorneys to commence 
the drafting of the necessary documents to 
carry out these iinderstandings and r·educe 
them to formal agree11ients and would appre-
ciate your prompt reply. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Further, Finding No. 4 is unequivocally supported 
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bv testimony of Mr. Koolsbergen, Tosco's president, 
~ho said, "There was no agreement as to term, be-
cause that was supposed to be negotiated in the option 
agreement and subsequently," (TR-1 Pg. 83 L 29-
30) and by its attorney, Mr. Tweedy, who testified, 
"The memorandum of July 25 [July Letter] provided 
an agreement between the parties as to what the op-
iion miqlit contain, but further provided that drafts 
would be prepared setting forth the terms and trans-
oction ." (TR-1 Pg. 114 L 4-8.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
Tosco argues that its commitment to prepare 
urafts setting forth the understandings embodied in 
the July Letter was not an agreement to do any-
thing. This position is so incredible that it does not 
deserve comment. 
As to its Finding No. 5, the Court could hardly 
have found otherwise. Finding No. 5 is: 
5. Contrary to the terms of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, Plaintiff did not prepare formal 
instruments expressing the transaction con-
templated by the parties. In fact, at no time 
subsequent to July 25, 1963, did Plaintiff pre-
pare, offer to prepare, or offer to execute any 
instrument which complied with Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2. 
1. The testimony of the same Tosco witnesses, 
Mr. Koolsbergen and Mr. Tweedy, supports the Trial 
Court. During cross-examination, Mr. Koolsbergen 
testified: 
Q. Are you aware that Mr. Tweedy's draft 
arrived in my office on the 22nd of July? 
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A. No, I am not aware of it. I would not be 
surprised if that was the case. 
Q. Now what other drafts did Mr. Tweedy 
prepare, what other drafts did he prepare 
in response to your instruction? 
A. I can't state for Mr. Tweedy's, so far as 
I know, none. (TR-1Pg.86 L 15-23.) 
Q. But there was no question, was there Mr. 
Koolsbergen, that it was Tosco's attor-
neys who were going to prepare the 
drafts? 
A. I don't think so, I think it was Tosco's 
attorneys and Larson's attorneys. 
Q. Well, I want to know from you, Mr. Kools- . 
bergen, whether or not after July 25, 
1963, Tosco's attorney prepared any 
drafts at all. 
A. So far as I know, they didn't, but that is 
my knowledge. (TR-1 Pg. 87 L 9-19.) 
Mr. Tweedy, in response to questions propounded 
by Defendants' counsel, testified: 
Q. 
A. 
But you do agree, Mr. Tweedy the draft 
that you mailed to me, which bears your 
office stamp of July 18, 1963, was not in 
compliance with the memorandums of 
July 25, 1963? [July Letter] 
No, Mr. Koolsbergen said that he had in-
structed his attorney to submit drafts. It 
was his understanding, and it was my 
understanding, that he was referring to 
the documents that had been transmitted 
to you for the purposes of initiating this 
particular transaction. 
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Q. That is not answering my question. 
THE COURT: It was his understanding, or 
yom· understanding? 
A. It was my understanding. 
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) My question was, did 
the draft that bears your date of July 18, 
1963, did it comply with the terms and 
conditions of the memorandum of July 25, 
1963? [July Letter] 
MR. ASHTON: If the Court please, I don't 
see how it could. This agreement of July 
25 had not yet come into existence. 
MR. DUFFORD: I will withdraw the ques-
tion. 
Q. (By Mr. Dufford) Did you ever submit 
a draft, Mr. Tweedy, to either Mr. Larson 
or to me, which complied with the memo-
randum of July 25, 1963? [July Letter] 
A. No, I had submitted my draft prior to 
that time. 
Q. Did you have something to add? 
A. Until I submitted drafts in February in 
response to your drafts. ( TR-1 Pg. 143 
L. 1-27). 
Q. When did The Oil Shale Corporation, to 
your knowledge, eve1· tender an instru-
ment to the Larsons for signature, that 
incorporated the terms of the July 25, 
1963 agreement? [July Letter] 
A. I don't think it ever did expressly incor-
porate all of those terms. (TR-1 Pg. 144 
L 13-20.) 
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Tosco maintains that Finding No. 7 is not sup-
ported by the evidence. In its argument to sustain 
its position, Tosco ignores the testimony of Lal'son, 
who testified that he told Mr. Tweedy, in January 
of 1964, the Tosco option had expired and that De-
fendants did not intend to discuss any further deal 
unless and until they had been paid the $20,000.00 
consideration for the option which had expired. (TR-
1 Pg. 28 L 11-25.) Although Tweedy and Kools-
bergen offered conflicting testimony, Larson's state-
ment is corroborated by: 
(i) payment of $20,000.00 by Tosco 
with four separate checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) each 
beal"ing a notation showing issuance fol' op-
tions granted, (Pl's. Ex. 7), 
(ii) the written memorandum ( Defs'. 
Ex. 19) of March 23, 1964, by anothel' at-
torney representing Tosco, i.e., Mr. Winston 
wherein it was stated, "Fred Larson and I 
met this morning in Washington to discuss 
the possibilities of compromising the differ-
ences which have arisen between Larson and 
The Oil Shale Corporation concerning their 
respective rights under the option agreement 
datedJnly 15, 1963 ... "(at Page 1), and 
(iii) the term of Larson's employment 
agreement with Tosco, although not stated 
in the July Letter, was verbally agreed be-
tween the parties to commence on July 15, 
1963 and end one year later on July 15, 1964, 
and was performed on that understanding. 
(TR-1 Pg. 72 L 18-25.) (Emphasi~ suppl~ed.) 
According to Tosco, there was no testimony md1-
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eating its recognition that the payment of $20,000.00 
was the result of an oral understanding (Plaintiff's 
Brief Pg. 41). However, Tosco overlooks the follow-
ing portions of the record: 
1. The four checks (Pl's. Ex. 7) issued 
by Tosco to Defendants, bearing notations as 
to options granted: 
2. Larson's testimony concerning pay-
ment of the $20,000.00, including his refusal 
to talk about any other deal until the payment 
had been made. (TR-1Pg.28 L 11-25.) 
3. Payment by Tosco of $20,000.00 in 
response to Larson's demand. 
4. Tosco's acquiescence in Larson's re-
peated warnings that the Tosco option expired 
on January 15, 1964. (Pl's. Ex. 3 and Defs'. 
Exs. 20 & 21) (TR-1 Pg. 196 L 15-30, Pg. 197 
& Pg. 198 L 1-10.) 
5. The telephone request by Lenhardt, 
Tosco's executive vice-president, requesting an 
extension of the option period and the payment 
of $20,000.00 following Larson's refusal to 
extend the term. (TR-1Pg.198 L 14-30.) 
The Trial Court's Finding No. 7 is further sup-
ported by the memorandums (Pl's. Ex. 3 and Defs'. 
Exs. 20 & 21) written by Larson to Mr. Koolsbergen. 
Each of these memorandums clearly indicate to Tosco 
that its option concerning the Larson lands would 
expire on January 15, 1964. Also, Larson orally ad-
vised Tosco on several occasions that the option would 
expire on January 15, 1964. (TR-1Pg.196 L 15-30, 
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Pg. 197 and Pg. 198 L 1-10.) Although maintaining 
that it did not agree to the period of the option as 
stated by Larson, it is strange that no one employed 
by or associated with Tosco refuted the Defendants' 
position as to the option period, until after the option 
had expired on January 15, 1964. It is highly signi-
ficant that the payment of $20,000.00 was made to 
the Defendants by four checks, mailed with no trans-
mittal letter setting forth the conditions (if, in fact, 
any such conditions existed as testified by Tosco's 
witnesses) under which such payment was made. It 
is difficult to believe that practices of this nature 
could be attributed to a large public corporation 
whose affairs were directed by individuals having 
the business experience of Messrs. Koolsbergen and 
Tweedy. 
Perhaps the most astonishing positions taken by 
Tosco, however, relate to the circumstances under 
which the $20,000.00 was paid and the conduct of 
their Executive Vice-President, Lenhardt. 
Tosco contends that the $20,000.00 was paid 
based upon Larson's assurance to Tweedy that docu-
ments would be executed (TR-1 p. 148 at L. 8-20) if 
Tweedy and Larson's counsel could resolve certain 
differences which then existed between Tosco and 
Defendants. 
Tosco is obviously a large corporation, and its 
president has an impressive background. (TR-1 pgs. 
63, 64 & 65) . He does not allow the corporation to 
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spend substantial sums for title and property exam-
inations unless formal documents have been signed 
(TR. 1. p. 71 L. 24-30), but he asks the Court to 
believe that he would authorize payment of $20,000 
without execution of formal documents and upon, 
as he and Tweedy testified (TR 1 p. 148 L. 23-28; 
p. 100, L. 1 7-20), the strength of a nebulous promise 
by Larson to sign documents still to be negotiated. 
Yet the checks issued to Defendants recited they 
were for options granted, (Pl's. Ex. 7). 
Tosco had legal representation throughout this 
transaction by both Winston and Tweedy, their ex-
perienced and capable counsel. 
It is therefore inconceivable that Tosco paid 
$20,000.00 upon Larson's unqualified assurance that 
the Defendants would execute something to be nego-
tiated and just as inconceivable that Tosco could, 
under such odd circumstances, pay $20,000.00 to De-
fendants without a letter of Transmittal or some 
other writing specifying in detail the conditions 
under which payment was made, or by requesting 
Defendants' written confirmation of such conditions 
prior to payment. Logic compels the conclusion, after 
consideration of all circumstances which surround 
payment of the $20,000.00, that Larson demanded 
payment of the $20,000.00 as a debt which Defend-
ants believed was due and payable. Tosco obviously 
agreed and paid with full knowledge of Defendants' 
position. Conversely, one would be forced to ignore 
the dictates of credibility to believe that Larson knew 
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and agreed, as Tosco contends, that Defendants' 
acceptance of the $20,000.00 would create an obliga. 
ti on on the part of Defendants to sign some form of 
document which would provide Tosco with a future 
six-month option to lease the Larson lands. The Trial 
Court resolved these discrepancies in favor of De. 
fendants. 
At this point, it is interesting to observe that 
even at this late date, Tosco does not ask the Court 
for enforcement of a mining lea.se, but, rather an 
additional six months option, during which time it 
would have the right to lease the La.rson lands upon 
exercise of the option. Even by giving full weight to 
all of Tosco's testimony, there is nothing in the recol'd 
of this case even remotely suggesting that Tosco paid 
$20,000.00 upon Larson's promise to give Tosco a 
further and additional six months option. ( TR-1 p's. 
121, 126, 147 & 148; p. 100L17-20.) 
Compare the position of Tosco to the actions of 
their executive vice-president, Lenhardt. Lenhardt 
was the author of the July 11 portion of the July 
Letter, and served as executive vice president of 
Tosco. Lenhardt called Larson in January 1964 re· 
questing an extension of the option period, and \vhen 
Larson denied the request, assured Larson that Tosco 
would pay the $20,000.00 due as soon as the necessary 
funds could be obtained (TR-1 p. 199 L 1-6). To 
explain these actions, Tosco attempts to point out 
three times in its brief that Lenhardt had allegedly 
no knowledge or participation in the Larson transac-
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tion after July 11 and until his phone call to Larson. 
(Tosco Brief, p. 6, 10 and 27). This is the executive 
vice president of the company who officed with Lar-
son in Beverly Hills, California subsequent to July 
15, 1963. (TR-1 p. 198 L. 8-18). This is the executive 
vice president who called Larson from New York, 
where Koolsbergen officed. (TR-1p.198, L. 14-30). 
This is the executive vice-president of a company who 
considered the Larson transaction sufficiently im-
portant to involve two attorneys, Winston and 
Tweedy, and to directly involve the company presi-
dent. This was a transaction involving 31,000 acres 
of land, and one which the executive vice president 
felt obligated to request an extension for, without al-
legedly conferring with either the company president 
or company counsel. This position is consistent with 
the strained interpretation of all facts of this case 
taken by Tosco throughout its Brief. 
III. DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO TOSCO'S ARGU-
MENT D 
A. TOSCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL. 
Tosco opines that it should be granted a new 
trial on the grounds that the Trial Court's Findings 
and Conclusions constituted "surprise." However, it 
is a foregone conclusion in any contested proceeding 
that one of the litigants must be "surprised" at the 
result. While Tosco may be entitled to some compas-
sion as the unsuccessful party, its disagreement with 
the Trial Court's ruling does not entitle Tosco to a 
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new trial. Indeed, if "surprise" is justification fol' 
a new trial, any litigant who diligently avoids ade-
quate trial preparation can be guaranteed surprise 
when the trial judge's decision is known. 
Tosco's basis for its accusation of surprise ap-
pears to arise out of the Defendants' reluctance to 
accept, without question, the Plaintiff's assertion 
that the July Letter, of and by itself, is a complete 
and definite agreement which can be specifically 
enforced. 
Assuming, only for purposes of argument, that 
Tosco's surprise theory is entitled to the Court's 
consideration, the Defendants' reluctance to accept 
Plaintiff's position with respect to the July Letter 
could hardly have come as a surprise to Plaintiff. 
This case was initiated by Tosco in October of 1964. 
The Defendants filed their Answer1 which clearly 
indicated Plaintiff's position, i.e., that the transac-
tion between Tosco and Defendants was expressed by 
the July Letter and other oral understandings which 
were not specified in the July Letter. Again, at the 
commencement of the trial in Provo, Utah on June 
22, 1966, Mr. Ashton, one of the attorneys for Plain-
tiff, made the following remarks concerning the 
Defendants' position: 
It was indicated, I think, at the first go around 
in chambers, that the Defendants apparently 
are relying on some kind of an oral agreement. 
We [Plaintiff] are relying on a written agree-
ment which was dated July 25 ... (TR-1, Pg. 
5 L 5-10.) 
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The Defendants' position has always been that the 
transaction between the parties was expressed by 
the July Letter and the oral understandings that: 
(a) Tosco's option to lease would com-
mence on July 15, 1963 and terminate on Jan-
uary 15, 1964, during which period the De-
fendants would not negotiate or contract with 
other parties for the sale or lease of their lands, 
(b) Larson's employment con tract 
would be for a period of one year, commencing 
July 15, 1963 and 
( c) Other essential and material pro-
visions contemplated by the parties would be 
negotiated and resolved subsequent to July 25, 
1963. (See Paragraph 1 of Defendants' First 
Affirmative Defense.) 
Further, it has always been Defendants' position 
that the transaction expressed by the July Letter 
and the oral understandings did not, as of July 25, 
1963, constitute a complete and definite agreement 
which was capable of being specifically enforced. 
(Defs'. Trial Memorandum, Pg. 14.) 
Defendants maintained in their Trial Memo-
randum, filed with the Trial Court (also part of the 
record on appeal) that the actions of the parties from 
July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964 created a situation 
under which Tosco had the benefit of .an exclusive 
option on the Larson lands, which they failed to exer-
cise and permitted to expire. (Defs'. Trial Memo-
randum, Pg. 14.) 
It is significant that Tosco cites only one case 
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(Nichols v. lVhitacrc, 12 Mo. App. 692, 87 S.\V. 594) 
in support of its position that Defendants' so-caller! 
change of theory misled Tosco and caused it to change 
its trial procedures. However, Nichols involved a 
jury and the improper instruction was not consistent 
with the evidence. Certainly one can appreciate thr 
havoc which might result from granting of an im-
proper instruction to the jury, which changed the en-
tire tenor of a case before it. Similar situations are 
not encountered in a trial to the Court. Tosco forgets 
that it, not Defendants, dictated the tenor of this case. 
Therefore, it is incredible that the Plaintiff would 
allow statements by Defendants' counsel or their wit-
nesses, to change the manne1· of their presentation or 
their theory of the case. Is it logical to believe that 
Tosco instantly changed its modus operandi upon 
hearing remarks of Defendants' counsel at the com-
mencement of trial? To arrive at the proper answer 
here, one need only look at Tosco's Reply to the De-
fendant's Trial Memorandum and note that Tosco's 
alleged disadvantage, created by the so-called change 
of theory, was not a matter of concern until the Trial 
Court first decided this case in favor of Defendants, 
even though Defendant's position was specifically 
stated in their Trial Memorandum, at Pages 14 and 
15 thereof. 
B. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION. 
In Section D of its Brief, Plaintiff contends that 
if the Court does not decree specific performance of 
the July Letter, then the Court must order the De-
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fendants to return the $20,000.00 they have received. 
It is Defendants' position that there is no basis 
for restitution in this case, because the Trial Court 
found that the July Letter, and oral understandings 
of the parties and their actions and conduct created 
an agreement whereby Tosco had the advantage of an 
option on the Defendants' lands from July 15, 1963 
to January 15, 1964, which option was permitted to 
expire by Tosco and for which it paid $20,000.00 as 
consideration. (See Trial Court Findings 3, 6 and 7). 
This involves a situation where Tosco chose not 
to acquire the Larson lands on the basis of the July 
Letter, as supplemented by the oral understandings 
of the parties. Obviously it wanted to reduce the cost 
of its acquisition of the Larson lands, but when that 
course of action proved unsuccessful, it then took the 
position that it had been wrongfully induced to pay 
$20,000.00 to Defendants on the strength of Larson's 
assurance that Defendants would execute some kind 
of document, the contents of which were still to be 
negotiated. It is particularly significant that there 
was absolutely no behavior or statements on the part 
of Tosco's representatives which refuted Larson's 
testimony, until after the expiration of the Tosco 
option on January 15, 1964. Conversely, every memo-
randum and all of Larson's acivities during the 
period from July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964, cor-
roborate Larson's testimony. 
The Court's Findings were based upon evidence, 
53 
both oral and documentary, in which it accepted Lar-
son's testimony over that of Tosco's witnesses, 
Tweedy and Koolsbergen. This conflicting testimony, 
was determined by the Trial Court in favor of the 
Defendants after a long and careful review of the 
record in this case. Those findings, being supported 
by the record, should be upheld by this Court. 
Having paid for a six months option which it had 
on the Larson Lands and having ignored and rejected 
Larson's attempts to bring the transaction to the 
point of execution of formal agreements, Tosco is 
not entitled to now claim that its $20,000.00 payment 
should be reimbursed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
190 North Carbon Ave. 
Price, Utah 
DUFFORD AND RULAND 
P.O. Box 459 
Grand Junction, Colorado 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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